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E;-; i s t e n c e and LJn iqueness o f S t och a s t i e Pr i e e E q u i l i b r i a i n 
H e t e r o q e n e o u s H a r k e t s . 
bummar 
In this paper we study pri.ee equilibria in a mark et where the 
behaviour of individual demanders is determined by means of discrete 
choice models- The good that is traded in the market is 
heterogensous,, Demanders may also differ in their preferences„ The 
number of demanders may exceed the the number of units of the good 
that is availab1 e in the market. 
In the first part of the paper we give a general öescription of the 
model and deal with continuity and differentiabiIity of the 
(eKpectsd) market demand functions,, We then study the behaviour of 
aggregate dema n d w h en p r ice s r i s e w i t h o u t a n u p p e r b o u n d.« 11 i s als o 
shown that the choice alternatives are always gross substitutes in a 
weak sense of the term and that strong gross substitutabiIity can be 
guaranteed by two additional assumpti ons,, The e;-: i stence of a price 
e q u i 1 i b r i u m i s t h e n prove n u n d er- w e a k gross s u b s t i t u tability and 
c: o n t 'i n u i t y o f the demand f u n c t i on s and u n i q u e n e s s under strong gross 
subst i tutability and dif f er ent i abi1i ty of the demand functions„ In 
subsequent sections it i s shown that a neccesary and suf f icisnt 
condition tor uniqueness is the non existence of a market segment 
with total demand tor the goeds in that segment is insensitive tor 
changes in prices, The paper is concluced with a comparison of the 
results that have been reached by others and are reported in the 
literature and a discussion of the interpretation of stochastie price 
equi1i bri a„ 

Introductior 
ïhroughout the paper we c: on si der a mark et where N different types 
of the same qood (housinq may be a qood example) are availahls in 
;ea amourn: fixed (positi ve) amounts S_ ,. n = l ,,*,,,,, N„ These 
be di str i buted over a fixed number, b ., of indiviauai aecision un 
(househo1d s) . M di f f eren t types of dec i s i on un i t s will be 
distinguisqhed CM < b). These individual decision makers are 
i n i t i a 11 y d i st r i b ut ed over' the var i D U S st at es in a p e.r t i c u 1 3.r way an d 
should be re-al Iocated. It is assumed that individual decision-making 
units do always have the possibility to withdraw f-rom the market 
(e.g. by means of migration) ;; this alternative will be denoted by 
means of an. index 0, Also ,, there may be actors who have just entered 
the market ; they 3.re dealt with as taeinq initially in state 0. For 
making unit can buy (rent) only one unit of the available supply. 
The demanders are assumed to be utiiity maxi mixers. In each period 
they ars confronted with N+l choice alternatives , viz„ moving to one 
of the N possible states or withdraw front the market, The utiiity 
associated with chosing any of these alternatives can be represented 
by means of a so-called conditional indirect utiiity function , i.B. 
a function that gives the highest value of utiltiy that can be 
reached by the decision maker concerned , given that he has to choose 
a 11ernative n ,, n:= 0, 1, . . . , N. Th i s i nd irect ut i 1 i ty f unct i on has as 
' a r iables and w i11 b e di f f er en t 
d fi 
The indirect utiiity of moving to choice alternative n for a 
household of type m that is currently in state n:' will be denoted as 
arquments a vector x of explanator 
-n 
U , and i s ass u m ec:i t o b e the su m o f a d e t er m i n i s t i c p a f 
m n • ~<n 
; „ and a stochastie part s , s 
-n • mn ' -->n 
mn' 
t h a t i s a f u n c t i o r t '..J ï 
U , (x ) = U , (x ) + s ., ( 1 ) 
mn • -*n — n mn • ~wi — n mn • -*n 
m== 1 , » .. ,. , M ;: n ' , n = 0 , 1 , „ » „ , , M 
T h e i n c I u s i on o f a s t och a s t i c c omponen t i n t h e i n d i r ec t u t i I i t y 
f u n c t :i. o n s m a k e s i t i m p o s s i b 1 e t o d e t e r i t t i n e t h e c h o i c e s o f t h e u t i I i t 
max i mi 2 i n g d e c i s i on u n i t w i t h c e r t a i n t y „ 11 i s on1y mean i n g f u I t o 
speak abcjut t h e p r o b a b i l i t v rr , t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e n w i l l be c h o s e n 
mn' -Hi 
by a deci si on irtaker be 1 ong i ng to c I ass m and c:urrently occupyi ng a 
unit of type n;' of the qood traded in the market,, The choice 
p r o b a b i I ities are d e -f i n e d a s 
mn' -*n 
•" , .-: v ., ., ., , n mn • ->n mn • --sn • • M ' '-. .£ ! 
n,n'=U,1,...,N 
and can o e aetermined as T D Ü O W S s 
w mn •' ~J0 'mn : 
mn • -sn 
n , i s 
mn• -mn' 




m= 1 _,.„., M , n ' , n = 0 , . . - , N . 
j ., -U + s , in 7 ; !Fn) and h „ds j is t h e 
mn • -*n mn' --sn • • mn • -$n mn • -mn • si mul taneous probabilitv density function o-f the vector s ., = 
-mn' 
Cs ., ..„*„„„£ ., ..II'. Th is f Line t ion will alwavs be assumed to have a 
m n • -¥-..! • • mn • ~M 
zero mean and a finite var i ance-covari ance matrix. 
"The choice probabi I ities rr ., will in qeneral be functions of all 
mn • -m 
the indirect utiltities U , .,.,''"' and theretore of all variables 
mn • -in • ' 
•:'> y\ \i ':- -i \i " " " f 'A h i " 
mn ;' nn mn > -r, -O" -1 !' ' -N ' 14.) • 
m — 1, „ u „ ,, ii , n
 :' , n—0, 
Total expected demand for choice alternative n , E) , can ,, on the 
basis o-f (4) be determined as : 
H N 
m= J. n • =u 
mn- mn- -*n ~u • -1 • -W 
n=0, 1 „„„=,„ N 
i rl) 
wh ere b ., denotes the number of deci si on-maki nq units of tvpe m that m n • . . . . . 
a r e cu r r e n 11 y in state n ? ,, T h i s t o t a 1 e ;•; p e c t e d d e m a n d i s t h e r e f o r e a 
funct.ion of all variables that influence the utilities attached to 
the various alternatives by the indlvi dual demanders ,, Put al so of 
the compasti on of the popu1at ion of these demanders and of their 
i n 11 i a 1 d i s t r i b u t i o n o v e r the var i o u s s t a t e s „ S :i. n c e a 1 1 c h o i c e 




in what foliows we will treat the demand functions D as i f the-* 
n 
represented a cietermi ni sti c: demand , although they in tact give only 
the expected value of a demand that is stochastic. Soms justification 
f or t h i s pr oc: edur e i s qiven by the f ac t that un der genera 1 
assumptions the ratio of actual stochastic demand and the total 
number of demanders tends to approach its expscted value D_/b when 
the total number of demanders b is large (see Lehocz ky E 19E30::i > , 
The limited availabiiity of units of the N types causes the 
followinq restrictions on the ailocation : 
D < S i./) 
n n 
n=l,,,.,N 
satisfaction of the constraints (7)„ A somewhat more demanding 
definition of equilibrium wi11 tae used in section 4. . 
hor proots of e>:istence and uniqueness of equilibria .i. *.- J. ^ 
to know under what cond i t i ons the demand f unctions D ara conti nuous 
n 
or differentiable in the variables x , x_1 , „ „ „ , x_ „ Si nee these 
functions are sums of choice probabi 1 i ty functions n ., „ this 
mn • ~sn ' 
invokes the question under which conditions these functions ars 
con t i n uous or d i f -f er en t i ab 1 s i n t h-e i r ar g urnen t s „ Th e f o 11 ow i n q 
p r o p o s i t i o n s ar e p r o v e n i n t h e a p p e n d i x „ 
Proposition 1 „ 1., The choice probability functions rr ., , 
•. • f^pt • _^-j 
m=i,...,M :, n-" , n = l, . . . , N , are conti nuous in the variables 
x .. , x ,„,,»„„ •;••.,, if and onlv if the utilitv functions v ., „ 
m=i ,„..»;, H , n'n=l, » « . , N ,, are conti nuous in their arguments x_ 
and the cumulative densitv functions H ., « s .. ) „ m=l, ,H „ 
mn • -mn• . . . 
n ;' -0„ 1 ,,»„„,, N are conti nuously di f f erent i abl e ai most evsrywhere. 
PrDDOsition 1.2„ The choi ce crobabi 1 i tv f uncti ons n ., „ 
, m n • . . . r , • 
m=l,...,M , n ' , n=l ,,„,,„, N ,,are di f f erenti abl e in the variables 
x .. „ x , „ „ » „ x,, if and only if the utility functions v 
_..,_,. - x • • — f s j m n • ...;lf-| 
m - 1 ,r „ „ „ ? H ,, n
 :',, •n = l. , N ,, a.re di f f erenti abl e in their arguments 
x and the cumulative density functions H ., ( s ., ) „ m=l „ . » . , M „ ~n mn• -mn• . . . 
n 7' =0 „ 1 „ . „ * „ N are t w i c: e d i f f eren t :i. ab 1 e a 1 most e ver y wh er e „ 
In discrete choice theory it is usually assumed that the probability 
densi ty f unct i ons are norma1 or (genera1i zed) extreme value, In these 
cases the conditions with respect to the cumulative density functions 
ment i oned in th e prop os i t i o r i s ar e a1wa ys f u1 f i11 ed„ A1so t he 
spec:i. f i cati ons of the i ndi reet u.ti 1 i ty f uncti ons that are used in 
. 2 > "equirements 
Throughout the rest o+ the paper it wil'i be assumed. that there are 
prices associated with all types of the good that are avaiiable in 
the market i„e„ with choice alternatives 1,.„,,„N„ The price D is óns 
, n 
o-f the ar q urnen ts ;•; of the indirect utilities U ., „ and all other 
-n mn • -m • 
arguments of that vector are assumed to tae constant , and can 
therefore be suppressed. This implies that the utility attached to 
al ternati ve 0 is constant» Furthermore it wi 11 be assumeci that the 
i n d i r e c t u t i 11 i e s U , Br e non i n c rsas i n ei i n p with : 
mn • -*n ~ n 
lim U , < D 5 = ••-*:> (8). 
p ---MM mn' -m n 
n 
m=l, ,, . . , H ,, n :' =0, 
All these assumptions seem to be quite natura!""'' ,. 
The following preiimi nary result is easily proven 
F' r o p o s i 't. i o n 2 . 1 „ 
1 i m D 
o -*co n 
• n 
Proof„ The proposition is proven when it can be shown that 
1 int rr „ = 0 tor al 1 m=l, , lv! , n :' =0, 1 „ . „ „ =, N and n=l, * „ ., , W. Now 
p .-«o mn • -m . . . . . . . . . 
• n 
look at equati on (3). When p -*™ « Li ., ~> -w and w ., , ., --> -c.3 for all 
n mn • -m mn • -n • • 
n:' ' =i ö,n, The probability dsnsitv function h , (s , ) was assumed to 
mn' —mn' 
have zero mean and a finite vari ance-covar i ance matri ;•; „ This implies 
that indeed lim rr ., =0 for all the reaui red m:'s „ n:' :'s and n:'s„ 
p _. -*«> mn • ~m Q. E. D „ 
Proposition 2.1 says that the demand for a particular alternative 
wi11 become arbitrarily close to zero if the price associated with ü 
becomes arbitrary larqe,, It wi 11 also be useful to krtow what happens 
to the demand D when all prices p , „ » „ » ,, p,. are in er easinq without an 
n 1 • • N 
LI p p e r b o u n d „ T h e a n s w e r is g i v e n b y t h e f o ]. ]. o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s 
rroposiiion 
1 i m D 
D •••*«> n 
< 10) 
n = l 
F'roof „ It can again be observed that the proposition is true when the 
validity of its analogon tor the individual choice propositions can 
be shown. Consider again equation (3)„ When all prices rise whithout 
h p =.nrp i"h,"r!" y.. 
'mn :' --sO 
negative ,, without lower bound» Given our assumpti-ons about tl-
probabi1ity densitv function h , (s , ) , this 
mn• mn• 
c e s t o d r a w t h e 
p_~w:» m n :' -Jn 
1 UJ! üf. 
n=l,.„„,N„ Q„E.D. 
sys that when the price o-f staying in -
the market , no matter w-h at aiternative wi 11 be chosen , becomes 
infinitely large , uitimateiy everybody wi11 decide to withdraw from 
the market,, E.g. when rents grow higher and high er in on e particular 
region ,, ui ti matei y everybody pret er s li.ving at another place where 
rents ars lower,, 
5 bross Subst itutabi1i ty . 
In conventional demand theory goods ars cal led qross substitutes 
when an increase in the price of qood n causes demand D to fall and 
n 
demand for all other qoods D , „ n:'^ n to rise (see e.q. 
n • 
VarianE 1978J> „ The assumption of gross substitutabi1ity is used in 
genera! equilibrium theory to prove the uniqueness of price 
equilibria , but is generally regarded to be very restrictive. It is 
t h e r e f o r e somewhat s u r p r i s i n g t h at in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e ;•; t (w h ere the 
demand functions arcs based on discrete choice models) the demand 
f unct ions do always sat i sf y a s1i gh11y weakened version of gross 
s u b s t i t u t a b i 1 i t y a n d t h at t w o we a k a s s u m p t i o n s s u f f ice t o g u aa~a n t e e 
complete qross subst i tutabi 1 i ty,, This wi 11 be shown in the neut two 
proposi ti ons,, 
-'r oposi t i on 3 „ 1 „ The demand f unct i ons D n =: i , „ „ „ , l'M , a r e 
non --deer e as i ng in the prices p _ ., ,, n ' *n ,, n'=l,, ,N' and 
non-i ncreasi ng in the own price p_ „ Hor eo ver , D... is 
non—deereasxng in all prices p._ , n 
Pr D O T „ !"•: suf f i c :i. ent c:onei i t i on + or thi s pr oposi t i on 
m a l oqon ho 1 ds f or a 11 choice D r obab i 1 i t v f unc t i ons ?T 
mn' •-•sn 
When the price D rises the variables ' n üünsiaer equat ï on >•. •:••, 
w._. , , ., all decrease or remain the same» Th is implies that the same 
„ When another price 
mn -w i 
wi11 be t r ue f or the choi ce p robab i1i t y 
rxses tne variap x e w 
n 
*th i .i. e 
mn' -in' 
mn' ~<n 
ncreases or remains the same 
ariataies w ., ,, remain the same,, Therefore the 
mn • -MI ' ' 
choice prohabi1itv rr ., increases or remains the same» It may 
•mn • -*n 
therefore be concluded that all choice probabi1ities 
n :' =0, 1 ü .i. 5 „ ,, ,,. 3 l 
mn • -n • 
•J ,, n=l„...,N are non-i ncreasi nq in the own 
price p and non-decreasinq in all other prices. It can in the same 
wav be proven that the choice protaabi 1 i ti es n , ... ars non-decreasi nq 
m n • -¥:.> 
in all prices p .,,...„ p . The analogon of the propos! t ion for the 
c h o ï c e p r o b a b ï i 1 1 i e s n +• h 
mn ' ~sn 
L I S h o l ds» Q „ E „ D „ 
We will refer to the propertv of proposition 2,2 as weak qross 
subst-itutability. It is :o see «trom equation (3)) that th 
strenger definition mentioned above ito be referred t 
qross subst i tutabi1i ty) r equires al 1 ind i reet ut i1ity 
strictly decreasinq in p_„ But it also requires a pos 
) as strong 
functions to be 
/pa 
£L\ 
probapi i i ty of cboosinq eacn ai ternati ve at a ü possibi e onces 
This can be guaranteed by assuming that the probability density 
function is positive al most everywhers'"" , 
Proposition 3,2,, The clemand functions D „ n = l....,N „ ars 
x ncreasi nq in tne prices p .., , rr f-r\ ,, n •= i ,,„.„,, N • ,, and 
decreasinq in the own price p when for at leas-t one m and n:' tor 
n 
which b ., is oositive the functions U ., , ., are decreasinq in 
mn ' mn• ~n • • 
., a n d w h e n t h e sim u 11 a n e o u s p r o b a b i 1 i t y de n s i t y 
function h , (s ., ) is positive al most everytwhere,, Furthermore , 
mn• -mn• 
D. is increasinq in all prices p.,„. 
u •" 1 ' 'M' 
Kr oof,, We will prove this proposition in a somewhat more -fo.rmal way 
than was used to show the vality of the precedinq ones,, Consider 
equacioni-i! and assume that a price p_., ., ,, w • =n ,, i ncreases,, ih( 
r e s u 11 i n q cha n q e in the c h o i c e p r o b a b i 1 :i. t y 
mn • -*n • 
t h a t. f u 1 f i 11 t h e c o n d i t :i. o n s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n iza n 
determined as i; 
ir the m and rr 
mn' ~w"i 
'mn ? ~*N "mn' -m ' '' m n • •••*.! 
•Tin ' —iiin ' 
) ds,.. 
mn • -*n' 
where A is the neqative chanqe in the val ue of w , , .. that occui' 
mn • -n • •' 
as a result of a chanqe in p 
n • ne expression on the 
riaht-hand-side of uil) is cleariy nonneqative. Si nee h .. < s , ; is 
mn" -mn' 
assumed to be positive al most evervwhere we can be sure that it is 
posi ti ve. 
Now assume that p increasés. We then fincl tor the chancie in the 
n 
choice protaabi.litv n ., tor the m and n:' that f ui f i 11 the 
mn' -n 
c on dition s men t ion ed in the pr op os it i on 5 
ATT 
mn' -:sn 
w co mn • 
I ƒ 




h ., ( s ., ) d s 
mn' -mn' 
,. , „ '...1 £r 
N n 
(125 
where A is the positive chanqe that occurs in all IJ ., because oi 
mn' -ïn 
the increase in p . We can be sure that the enoression on the 
n 
right-hand-side of (12) is neqative since the probabi1ity density 
function is positive al most evervwhere» It can be demonstrated in an analoqous way tha the m and n
:' 
that fullfill the conditions of the proposition rr .  .. increasés when 
mn' -)0 
any of the prices p, , D... increasés» 
1' N 
IM o w 1 o o k a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a q q r a q a t e d emand ,, q i v e n i n e q u a t i on 
(5) ,, where instead of the vector 
k now f r om p r op os i t i on 2„3 t hat (f or n > 
i t s o w n p r i c e ID a n d n o n - cl eer es. s ing in a 11 o t h e r p r i c es si n c e al 1 
•; on e snouid reaa prices p „ we -•n n 
1) D is non-increasinq in n 
h o 1 c e p r o b a ta1 j. i t i e s n 
mn' -jn 
; u r e t h a t D w i 11 be c i e c r e a s i n a i n i t s own pr 
n 
r o p e r t y . We can t h e r e + o r be 
e a n c! i n c r e a s i n q i n 
a l l o t h e r p r i c e s i. 
pr obabi1i t i es n 
mn • -;n 
have . j u s t p r o ven, 
soon as this is the case fof . 11 e cnoice 
:or on e partic: ui ar m and n:' „ This is what we 
In the sa me way D„ wi 11 be i ncreasi nq in all prices p„ ,,„„»„p as 
., .. are so tor on e particular m 
in' -JU s o o n a s the c hoics p r ob ab111ties 
and n:',, This was also proven,. 
11 m a y t h e r e f o r e ta e c o n c 1 u d e cl t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n i 'alid. Q.E.D. 
When t h e cl e m a n cl f u n c: 11 o n s U a r e d 1 f t e r e n t i a b l e we have 
n 
au . / aa = o 
n' =u 
n = i , . 
si nee the choice orobabi 1 i ti es ?r ., have to acid up to 1 for all m 
mn -*n • 
and n. Because of the weak qross substitutabi1ity this implies that 
the own price effect öD /do wi11 be neqative as soon as one of the 
n n 
cross effects dD _, /3p_ , if^n is positive. 
Strong qross su.bstitut.abi 1 i ty of aggregate de mand functions based 
on logit models for individual choice behaviour was used by 
AnasC 19823 and by Anas and Chat 1986IU It seems not to have been 
realized thus f ar however that weak gross substitutabi1ity is an 
al most natural c har act er i st i c of aggregate ciemancl functions based on 
d isc r e t e c h o i c: e m o cl e 1 s. 
The weak gross substitutabi1ity eases the proof of the existence of 
a price equilibrium , as wi11 become clear in the next section. 
4_Pri.c:e_Egui_l ibrmm, 
A price equi librium wi 11 now be definec! as foliows s 
Definition„ A price eauilibrium is a set of nonneqative prices 
...J , , , „ „ „ , |.J such that D for all n=l,u„«.N and D =S when 
n n 
The remarkable fact , that wi11 be proven beiow , is that a price 
equilibrium exists in the market described ataove under the rather 
weak assumptions listeci at the beginning of section 2 with the only 
additional requirement that the aggregate demand functions &re 
conti nuous,, 
Proposi_ti on_4J1l „ When the demand functions D_ ,, n=0, ,, N , are 
c on t i n uous ,, t her e ex i st s a pr i c e equ i 1 i br i um i n t he mar k et 
described above. 
hroot,, we use a simpi e price i ustment mechan i sm,, Buppose that a 11 
p r ï c e s a r e ï n x 11 equa.1. to ..et p equal ö ( ö>0) when 
u exceeös 
n n 
and equal to 0 otherwise,, Because of the weak qross 
ubsti tutabi 1 i ty (propos! ti on 3„ 1) we can de sur e that. for these 
go o cis t o tand i n i t i a l l y 
r e f n a i n q r e a t e r t h an o r eq u a l t o s u p p 1 y as t h e p r i c e a d j u s t ment 
proces J.T. is iheretcrs ciear tnat a p n c e equ urn nas neer 
•eached when the process terminates. From the properties of the 
demancl functi on n at wer e est ab 1 i shed i n sec t i on 2 ( Pr oposi t i on 2 
we can be sure that the process stops si nee S is positive tor all 
n 
n~l„.„. , N and demand tor all alternatives 1 to N' becomes arbitrary 
small when its price rises without an upper bound. Therefore a price 
e q u i 1 i b r i u m e ;•; i s t s. Q,, E „ D . 
An attractive feature of the proof qiven ataove is that it suggests 
a way to compute the price equilibrium s start with all prices equal 
to 2ero and increase the prices of those choice alternatives tor 
wh i ch there i s e;•; cess demand" is simpie approach is po bli 
because of- the weak gross subst i tutabi 1 i ty of the demand •functions. 
5 IJ n i q u e n e s s o f F:' r i c e E q u i 1 i b r i u m „ 
It is useful to know whether a price equilibrium is unique . i„e. 
whether there is only one such equi1ibriurn, When one bel ieves that 
markets tunction in such a way that prices equilibrate supply and 
demand ,, uniqueness implies that the market equi librium is fuliy 
determinate in the sense that there can only be one set of prices 
that cor r espond to equ i 1 i br i um „ 
In t h e present section a suf f i c i ent c ondi t i on f or the un i q ueness of 
a price equilibrium wi11 be derived on the basis of the global 
unival enee theorem of Gal e and NikaidoE19653. This theorem states 
that a f un et ion is (qlobal ly) o n e--1 o-on e i f the matrix of its 
•first-order partial derivatives is (positive or negative) 
quasi -def i ni te. The LIS e of this mathematica! tooi mak es it necessary 
to assume di f f erenti abi 1 i ty of the demand functions I) . we will also 
assume strong gross subst i tutabi 1 i ty in the ag gr eg at e ,, i„e„ we 
require dD /dp , to be neqative for n'=n and positive otherwise. 
n ' n • 
Progosi tion_5^jL When the demand functions D_ ., n=0, 'i ' " 'i av" 
• i—' •••••. :~1 ' d i f f eren t i ab1 e and t he c h o i c e a11 er n at:
subst i t ut es ,, there ex i st s a un ique pr i ce equi 1 i br i um i n the 
market described above. 
u r u qL Ieness we d e t 1 ne t h e s e t o i w 11 n p l_' =• 1 '.. .!. 
e q LI i i i D r ï u m p r ï c e s p „ n o r e o v e r 
• n 
i e i IJ oe !_ne matr he m a t r i x w i t h e I e m e n t s 
dl) / 3 p 
n t o r n , n •" fcL 
M c K e n z i e L 1 9 5 9 J > i „ e 
i he ma tri ;•; D"' has a dominant diagonal ;ee 
Z , . ÖD ,/dp 
n • *sn n • n 
1 4 'i 
ne vaj. i 
n , n :' €C ' 
gu.aranteed by the strong grass 
) 
substi tutabi I i. ty (see equati on (14) ) '. Diagonal dominance implies 
that the matr i x D" i s quasi -cl e-f i n i te (see aqai n McKenz i e C 19591! ar 
p 
n o t e 13 o f c h apter 2) . ui u a s i ~ d e f i n i t e n e s s i m p lies g 1 o bal univa 1 e n c: e 
by the Bale-Nikaido theorem (see Gal e and Ni kai doL'19653 or 
MikaidoïlvèS:! , chapter 7). And this means that i-f there exists a set 
of prices -CD' n€S 3- tor wich D equals £ t is unique. mi: 
n • n n 
ensures uniqueness o-f the set of positivo equilibrium prices ., given 
the tact that the other prices are equal to zero, When all prices ars 
positive in equi librium , this also completes the proo-f. When some 
prices are zero however we still have to show the uniqueness of.the 
complete set of equi 1 i bri um prices £p''' ,,„„„, pJJ', ]• „ To show this 
consider the possibility that there exists another price equilibriLim 
D".' . „ „ „ . D."'_ 1- „ In this alternative equi librium at least on e of the „ „ . , p,
prices p n n ft b has to be positive., bo at ïeast one price p nas 
to be larcier than D '„ Now let all prices p ' which exceed 
' n n 
, * .. 
t o p „ 
decrease 
f ar t h e alt er nat i ves wh ose pr i c es r erna i n unchang ed duri nq t h i s 
operation and for those that have no price associated with them 
decreases ,, while the total demand for the goocis whose prices have 
decreased i ncreases. 'Then 1 et the pr i ces that remai ned unchanged thus 
f a r ( i f any) increase t o p''[ „ 11 f o 11 o w s f r o m the g r o s s 
substitutabi1ity that during this second process the total demand for 
the alternatives whose price initi ally decreased ,, i ncreases again. 
This means that for the set of new prices total demand for these 
a 11 er natives i s h i qh er t h an i n eq u :i. 1 i b r i um „ But 11"! e n ew pr i •:::es s\rs 
t h e e q u i 1 i b r i u m p r i c e s i p 4e h ave ther e f ore reached 
contraciiction and must conciude that the price equilibrium is 
c o m p 1 e t e 1 y u n :i. que. Q. E. D. 
It may tae noted here that in case all prices are positive at 
equi1i bri um the assumpt i on of s t rong gross subst i t ut i b i1i t y can be 
relaxed to one of neqativeness of the 'own' partial derivatives 
dD /dn . Uniqueness of the price equilibrium can still be n ' n 
öemonstrated in this case"'. 
Prop os i ti on 5.1 q i ves a suf f ic ien t c on d it i on f or un i q uen ess. 11 
would" be useful to have sufficiënt conditions f "i - u m q uen e ss t o 
e;•; i st as we 11 . Thi s i ssue wi 11 be d i seussed i n t he ne;•; t eet i on . 
6 Mon-üniqueness of Price Equi 1 ibr.i urn, 
arises when the demand is not sensitive for chanqes in on e price 
say p _., ,, in a particular range H gi ven the values of all other 
prices „ i.e. when dl) /da , =0 for all n=0„.« 
n ' n • 
rv €-tl, .. . . ,, NT 3-. 
N and some 
!~'roposi_ti on p̂ jL „ Non-uniqus price equi libria may occur when the 
demand functions E) ,, n=0,l, ,N are di f f erenti abl e if there 
exists an interval 
n 
'I CU' CPnr •. P̂ ;. J •, (Pn:, *P^, ) for price P n ? and 
values p for all other prices „ such that dD , /du .,-0 whenever n n • n • 
p n - H n : 
and p =p for all other „ n=l n ' n n ?sn • 
i i U U' T 
dD /dp = n ' n 
Mot e first that the f act that dD ., / dp , =0 implies that 
n • n • 
ïi ene wea 
substi tutabi 1 i tv and equation (13)). Choose p ., € P , and let p =p 
n' n • n n 
for all other n=l, . . . , N:' . Determine the associated values for the 
total demands D (n=0, . „ » „ iM) . Set S equal to D for all n=l,...,N. n n n 
NIow let p ., chanqe by a email amount Ap , „ in such a way that n • . . . n • 
p ., +Ap ., remains within P , , Th en the values of the demands D 
n • nÉ n • n 
(n=0,.n.,N) do not chanqe,, We have therefore shown the existence of a 
n o n ••- u n i q u e p r i c e e q u i 1 i b r i u m „ Q,. E. D „ 
A sec and ,, 1 ess obvious ,, possibility for non-uni queness to occur 
a r i s e s w h e n a certa i n m a r k e t s e q m e n t f u n c: t i o n s i n cl e p e n d e n 11 y o f t h e 
o-f the pric 
whenever E du / dp „=0 tor all n ' €C , 
n tL- n n • 
st a t es whi c h b e1 onq to t h e mark et seqmen 
A! her e C denotes the set of 
t. In this case chanqes of 
I y i n f 1 u e n c e al 1 o cation o f t h e d einand w i t h i n t h a t s e q m e n t„ 
lt is useful to introducé some additional notation at this point» 
n€C can be incorporated in a vector that may be 
sctor i s equal to thE 
he prices p_ 
ienoted by p The number of elements of this 
denoted a* 
AII il PO 
Propositi on Mon-un ique pr i c e equi1i br ia may occur when t hs 
demand functions D , i •-! c n ! tr;: L.i J. i ! 
a l l n : ' € C and dD / d p , „ =0 f o r a l l 
n n • • 
; OU /öp ., =ü t o r 
n ti..; n n ' 
n a s e t P p o f p r i c e s p, 
• for w h i c h h a s a n o n e m p t y i n t s r i o r and f o r some - f i x e d v a l u e 
n£ C 
n 
:'roof „ Set all prices p , equal to p 
n • n 
:he submarket consistinq of the alternat 
for those nffj» Now consider 
es n€ C. On this submarket 
total demand ,L- ....  ü r! d n tiJ n 
as a fixed value D , independent of the prices 
is lons 
f o r t h e s e p r i c e s p 
P „ n t L; , a
• n • these remain within the set F ; o s e v a 1 u e * 
associa'ced demands Jü 
: C , from the interior of P„. Determine the 
'irst assume that all D :'s are positive,, Th en 
n 
choose S =D for all ntC and a price eciLii 1 i bri Lim will be es tabi ished, 
n n 
Wow increase one positive price p t~ s _ 
amount jüp ., r , in such a way that 'the new vector of prices remains 
within the set P_. When the demand D does not change the 
non—uniqueness of the equilibrium prices nas been estabiished» When 
it decreases ., demand for another type of dweil ing n:' (n:'€ C) must 
have increased,, Now start the algorithm used in the proof of 
proposi ti on 4.1 with the new prices as starting point,, Then a new 
vector of equilibrium prices will be estafolished with all new prices 
greater than or equal to those at the starting point and some 
greater,, Wh en this new vector f al Is out si de the set P p the procedure 
can be repeated with a smaller value of Ap until a new vector of 
e q u i 1 i b r i u m p r i c e s is r e a c h e d that is a n e 1 e m e n t o f P.:,' ' „ 
Next ,, assume that some demands D „ n€ C , are zero for the Ie vel 
n • 
of prices c hos en. Define C:' to be the set of stat es for which demand 
is positive,, Let. S =D tor n€ C;' and choose arbitrarv oositiv-e values 
n n n£ C:' . Set the prices p „ n $ C' equal to zero. Then d tor nt ü n 
we have found a price equi librium,, Now let on e of the positive 
p „ n€ C' , increase bv a small amount Ap and use the same 
n • • n 
procedure as in the case when all clemands D_ , n€ C were positive and 
take care that at the new equilibrium prices the demands tor the 




equal to zero increase tay a small amount,, If the demand for this 
alternative remains equal to zero we have again -found non-uni queness» 
Si nee this demand can only decrease or remain the same as a 
consequente of the rise in the. price associateci with it this has to 
be the case. 
Th i s demon st r at es t h e n on -un i q LI en ess of t h e p r i c e eq u i 1 i b r i urn. 
Q„E„D„ 
The situation considered in the last proposition is that of a 
segmented market. When the supply on this market segment is equal to 
the total demand on this segment and this demand is constant for all 
possible price vectors such a market segment ,, when considered on its 
own , is cailed a taalanced market (see AnasC19S23 ,, Eri kssonC 19863 
and SmithC1988 3). 
As is cl e ar from the last two proposition s ,, the viola t ion of the 
assumption of streng gross substitutabi1ity on an open set of price 
v e c t o r s m a y r e s u 11 i n n o n -- u n i q u en e s s „ C1 e a r 1 y s o m e t h i n g m o re t h a n 
weak gr o s s s u b s t i t u t a b i 1 i t y i s n e e d e d f o r u n i q u e n e s s ,, a 11 h o u g h 
st ronq g ross sub st i t ut abi1i t y may be t oo muc h. 
On the basis o-f the resul ts reac hed above on e may c on j eet ure that a 
necessary and sufficiënt condition for a unique price equilibrium 
w.h en t h e d eman ei f un c t i on s ar e d i f f er en t i ab 1 e i s t h e n on --ex i st en c e of 
a subset C of all states anc: 
non-empty interiar , with 1 
c^ pz •!- c:. ps -| of prices p_ ,, n €C 3 with a 
dD / d p , =0 f • U i c l J n 6L: n ' n 
t h e c a s e o f p r o p o s i t i o n 6 - 1 a s w e l 1 a s t h a t o f 6 . 2 
n:' €C. This covers 
It shoulcl be noted that the condi ti ons stated in these propositioris 
show the possibility of non-uni queness ,, but that this does not imply 
t hat n on •--un i q ueness w i 1 I oc c ur i n p r ac t i c e „ I n f ac t t h i s may 
sometimes be 1ess probatale given the values of the supply volumes S 
i n a q i v e n s i t u a t i o n 
H iwcessar S Li f f i c i e n t C o n d i t i o n f o r U n i q u e n e s s . 
In the present subsection we wiI1 prove the correctness of the 
c on.j eet ure ment ion e cl at the end of the previous sec t ion , vïz„ t!' 
the existence of a set of states that function as an independent 
market segment tor some set of pr 
c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p o s s i fa i 1 
t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h s 
uni queness,, 
,-i i > ary ana 4- 4-icient 
t y o f n o n •- u n i q u en e s s a n cl there f o r e t h a t 
set i s n e o e s s a r y a n d s u f f i c i ent f o r 
Proposi ti_on_7Ll „ When the demand functions ars cli f f erenti abl e ,, 
there exists a unique price equilibrium in the model described 
above if and only if there does not exist a nonempty subset C o-
;ates such that E ...r.oD /do . -~Ö tor all n:' 6 C 
n tl, n ' n • 
on a s rf, P OH 
pri ces p ,, n€C , which has a non-empty interior , when all other 
prices have some fixed values p „ n't C. 
. n . 
Proof,, Existence of a price equi librium follows trom proposition 4=1 = 
We therefore concentrate our attention on the uniqueness» 
The proposition says that non-uniqueness can occur if and only if 
there exists a set C of states and a set P of associated prices as 
tnno+h :n.Dsö above , toqe 
;uch tnat /., tn 
with fixed values of the prices for other 
=0 for all rr' fc C„ We will prove this 
•pni i i r e d 
nfcl.; n . n 
equivalent version of the proposition. 
(i) Sufficiency* If there exists a set C with 
p r o p e r t i e s a n o n - u n i q u e e q u i I i b r i u m is p o s s i b 1 e 
(ii) Mecessity» Suppose there &re two vectors of equilibrium prices 
p':' and p''„ We assume , without loss of qenerality , that p"' has at 
least one of its elements qreater than the corresponding element of 
p'\ We now ciefine three sets of states» A state n is an element of C, 
% . • • " • * 
when p exceecls p „ an element of !.J„ when botn pri ces ar~e equal to 
n n i 
each erther , and an element of C..,. when p'" e x c e e d s p". F'ix all pri c e s 
.:> • n n 
at their equi librium level p''„ Now clecrease the pri c e s for the s t a t e s 
n€C. in the direct ion of p'„ A<: 
l n 
r e s u 1 1 o f t h i s o p e r a t i on t o t a I 
demand E)..., =E ...., D wi I I m c r e a s e o r r e ma i n t h e sa me» Suopose i t 
L- n tü . . n 
i n c r e a s e s» ï l"i en 3. e t t h e p r i c e p „ n €C , d r o p f u r t h e r t o t h e o t h e r 
n • 1 
equi librium leve Is p'n and let the pri ces p „ n €C...r increase to the 
n n -.:• 
8 Comparison with other Results. 
An as C198211 has probably been the first on e" wha studied the 
existence of prace equilibria in markets where there &.ve H classes of 
actors who all have to choose among a finite numtaer of alternatives 
and take their decisions on the basis of discrete choice theory (in 
h i s case more spec if i cal 1y the mult inomi al 1og it model)„ He also 
i n t r o d u eed the met h o cl o 1 o g y of c o n c e n t r a t i n q the a 11 e n t i o n o n the 
determi ni sti c version of the model ,, which is valid only when the 
n u m b er of m a r k e t p a r t i c i p a n t s i s 1 arge „ "1" h e e q u i 1 i b r i u m o f t h i s 
system was named a stochastic market equilibrium by Anas , because of 
t h e r e 1 a t i o n o f t h e m o cl el w i t h r a n d o m u t i 1 i t y t h eory. 11 s h o u 1 d b e 
c 1 ear h owever that t he eq u i 1 i b r i um whose e;•; i st en ce i s p r oven i s 
coinp 1 ete 1 y determini st i c and that the r e 1 ation of th is equi1ibr i um 
w i t h t h e s t o c h a s t i c m o d e 1 n e e d s f u r t h er d i s c u s s i o n (s e e t h e n e ;•; t 
3r m s t oe h ast i c mark et equi1i bri um has taecome more or 
i ess tommon in the liter at ure to denote mark et clean nq situatie; i n 
•.'Li U i i L I ! fc h e b a s i s o f d i s c r e t e c ho i c t m o ei e i s w h e r e o erna n ei i s d e t e r m 
m o c! e 1 s a n d s u p p 1 y i s f i ;•; e d ,. 
AnasC 19 E! 21! c o n s i ö e r e cl t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c: h t h e t o t a 1 n u m b e r o f 
d w e i l i n g s i s e x a c t l y e q u a l t o t h a t of t h e a c t o r s p a r t i e i p a t i n g i n t h e 
! ,-i F- U 1= t 
t or wnïch these conc ons s.r e f u 1 f i 11 ed al led a balanced market. 
equilibrium is not unique. The value of one price (say p ^ - c a n be 
f i ;•; ed i n ad vanca. 
The assumption of -a balanced market is not a very realist ie ene. 
Con s id er e.g„ the h ous i n q mar k et, Wh en t h e pr ic es of dwe11in g s b ec ome 
very high , the f or mat ion of new households may be postponecl ; when 
they s,rs very 1 D W a 1 arqer numtaer of new households may be formed,, 
p r i c e s o f dwe 11 i n g s in the regio n u n d e r c o n s i d eratio n ,. 'T' h i s w i 11 
especially be the case when co mm uiting to and trom other reeion? 
possi bi e 
i\| o iwit n standing this ia c k o t alism , the balancedness assumption 
is ma i n t a i n ed i n t wo other c on t r i b ut i on s t o t h e 1 i ter at ur e on 
s t o chas t i c ma r k et e q u i 1 i b n a , v i z . E r i k s s o n C 19 8 h 1 a n d S m i t h E 19 S 8 ] . 
Er i ksson E 19S6II st ud i es the class of genera 1 i z ed eK t r eme value models 
but does not con si der price equi libria ,, but equilibria in terms of 
the values of the systematic utilities» In nis model all individuals 
attach the same systematic utility value to all alternatives. 
D i f f e r e n c e s between i n d i v i d uals a r e c! i f f e r e n c es i n t h e s i m u ltaneous 
probability density functions of the rand om terms,, The assumpti on of 
equal values tor the systematic utilities tor all individual actors 
shou 1 d be consi dered as unreali st i c „ Er i ksson reaches e;•; i stence 
r esu11 s as we11 as a necessar y and suf f ic i ent condi t ion f or 
uniqueness of the equilibrium values of the systematic utilities up 
t o a d d i t i o n s o f the s a m e s calar val u e „ This c and i t i on states ,, 
loosely speaking , that the balanced market should not have a market 
seq men t C » as i n p r op os i t i on é> „ 2 ,, t h a t f un c t i on s i n cl ep en cl en 11 y f or 
s o m e s e t o f p r i c e s. 
Sm! th E 198S "J consi clers the class of balanced markets in genera! and 
t h e case w h e r e i n d i v i cl u a 1 c h o i c e s a r e m o cl e I e cl b y cl i s c r e t e c h o i c e 
models as one possibi1ity. For this special case he restriets his 
attention to specifications of the systematic utility functions that 
are scala-- or transl ati on-i nvari ant , which means that mul ti pi i cati on 
of all prices with the same positive seal ar resp. addition of the 
s a me s c: a 1 a r t o a 11 p r i c e s cl o e s n o t i n f 1 u e n c e the val u e s o f t h e 
di f f er en ces U , -U In his model the svstematic parts of 
mn ' -m mn • ~an ' ' 
the utilities attached to each alternative may be functions of all 
10) 
prices 
Anas and ChoL 198611 dr op pad the assumption of balancedness ,, and 
proved existencs and uniqusness of equil ibrium in a model where e;-;it 
is possible and where the probabiIistic choice functions are given by 
the 1 o q i t m o d e 1 „ 'T h eir p r o o f of u n i q u e n e s s u s e s t h e 6 a 1 e •-•  N i k a i d o 
theorem. Proposition 5.1 above is closely analogous to their 
u n i q u en e s s r e s u 11. 
The necessary and sufficiënt condition for uniqusness stated in 
proposition 7.1 has not been not mentioned in the literature for 
models as general as the ones studied in the present paper. ït is 
however closely related to the necessary and sufficiënt condition 
Eri kssonï 19861! developed for a much more restricted type of market. 
9 Interpretation of the price equilibrium. 
There are (at least) two possible interpretations of the price 
equilibria discussed in the previous section, They can be consiclered 
as the outcome of a mar ket process, They can a 1 so be i riterpreted as 
the optimal values (in some sense) for the government to set the 
pri ces. 
The former interpretation of price equilibria is common in the 
ec on om i c 111 er at u.r e ,, a 1t h oug h n ot w i t hout d i f f i c u 11 i es „ Th e q uest i on 
of who changes the prices when they do not equilibrate the market , 
turns out to be difficult to answer in a way that is consistent with 
pri ce-taki nq behaviour of part i ei pants. Notwithstanding that ,, it may 
be said that the main reason for economists to study the e;; i stence 
a n d o t h er" p r o p e r t i e s o f p r i c e e q u i libria i s t h e idea that markets d o 
function in reality in such a way that demand may approximateiy equal 
supply„ 
Market c1 eari ng i n t he stochast i c ver si on of the mode1 requ ir es in 
p ri n c ipIe di f f er en t prices f or d if f er ent p eriod s (given the same 
initial distribution of the actors over the various states) „ as a 
result of differences in the realisations of the random terms. When 
the same or i qi na 1 situation of the market. cou 1 d be realized mors than 
ir i nq pr i c:es wil.!, nevsrtnei ess most I i keI y be 
somewhat different „ aithough 1ess so when the number of market 
p a r t i c: i p a n t s is la r q e. 
1" h e s e c o n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p r i c: e e q u i i i b n a is 1 e s s c o mm o n i n 
economi c s ,, but i s men t i oned r epeat ed I y i n t he 1 i t er at ur e on 
stochastic price equi1ibria„ AnasE 1982 3 tries to motivate the conce 
b y showing t hat at the st oc hast i c pri o e eq ui1i br ium t h e probability 
of market clearing is maximal 1"'. Eri ksson il 1986 3 shows that at the 
stochastic price equilibrium the expected value of the unsatisfied 
demand is minimal,, Clearly the idea taehind these statements is that 
there are qood reasans tor a governmental agency that controls the 
housing market to set the prices at their stochastic equilibrium 
val Lies. 
Nevertheless the possibility exists that when this ruls'is adopte 
words of Eri kssor rails to c :lear •ene marxei: ~ in m e 
'l v 'j 
mi serabl y """"' . This wou ld f ore e the qovernment to use some 
s e c o n d - r o u n d - a 11 o c a t i o n p r o c ed u r e s ,, w h i c h a.re considere d brie f 1 y in 
An as L' 19823,, Mor e o ver ,, when the rand om terms in the utilities 
attached to the various alternatives ars serially correlated this 
prics-settinq rul e may give rise to persistent excess-demands and/or 
e xc ess sup plies i n some seg men t s of the mar k et. 
'The ditference between the two i nterpretati ons may also be 
illustrated .by again considering the possibility of otaserving the 
i -f- -i r-i r-t i™, •£ •!•• K m rn ;.̂  H" !.•• ,-v, -I" ,Y', r*> K- er, i- K •ame p r i c e s 
wou ld be set ,, but the demands for the various al ternati ves woul 
d i f f e r f r o m p e r i o d t o p e r i o d „ 
It should be clear however that , in case there is no serial 
correlation in the random terms the differences between the two 
i nter pr etat i ons di sappear when the number of market part i c i pants 
becomes larqe. 
Notes. 
l)E.q. when all & , „ , are assttmed to be independent and 
m n • -m • • 
identically extreme value distributed the iogit model ;, 
n ., = expUJ , )/E , , exp(U ., „ ., ) resul ts, 
mn • -c* mn • -s*** n • • mn • -n • • 
2>See the many applieations af the logit model , e.g. in 
D o m e n d c::h and'McFaddenL19743 and AnasË19823. 
3) Someti mes it may be useful however to have more than one 
price as an argument of the utility function. E.g. when the 
model refers to a housing market where dweilings are 
Dwner-occupied the difference between the price of the old 
dweil ing , p ., ,, and that of the new one » p__ , may be taken 
as an argument of the utilitv function U 
mn • -m 
4)Consider e.g. the case in which the utility of choiee 
alternative n nas to exceed a treshoid value before it wi11 
ever be chosen» If the utiltiy of this choiee alternative is 
below that treshoid value its probabi1ity of being chosen is 
insensitive to (small) changes in prices which contradiets 
strong gross substitutabi1ity. 
'5) A1 rn o s t e v e r y w h e r e i s a t e c h n i c a 1 1 er m m e a n ing s 
'everywhere . possibly except on a set of measure zero*". 
6)l"he algorithm starts with all prices equal to zero and 
increases the prices of the choiee alternatives tor which 
there is excess demand. One should be careful however not to 
increase prices so much that the excess demand turns into 
excess supply. 
7)It shoul d be noted that 0 € C* and that öD../öp > 0. • 
u n 
8)This follows fram the fact that every matrix with a 
quasi —dominant diagonal and its diaqonal terms non-zero has a 
dominant diagonal. See McKenz iel! 1959 3 . 
9)This is possible by the continuity of the aqgregate demand 
functions. 
10)Thi s c overs the case men t ion ed i n n ote 3 , wh i1 e 
i ncorporation of the pr i ce difterenca D ••-p , as an arqument 
, n n. 
o f t h e u t i 11 i y f u n c t ion q u arantee s t r a n s 1 a t :L on i n var :i. ance. 
11)He shows this to be the case when there'is oniy one class 
of actors. When there are more classes he claims to have 
establ :i. shed that this is no long er the case; However 
ErikssonL' 19863 points out that this claim is f al se. This 
leaves the issue open tor the case of more than one class of 
actors. 
12) Er i ksson II1986 3 p „ 553. 
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Appendix,, Continuity and Pi f terenti abi 1 i ty of the Aqqregate Demand 
In this appendix propositions 1»1 and 1.2 will be proven. We will do 
t h i s b y sh ow ing t h at the propositi on s h o I d -f ar t In e c h o i c e p r oP ab i 1 i t y 
functions rr ., „ Si nee the aqqreoate demand functions are sums o-f 
m n • -jn 
these choice probability functions the prooi' tor the aqqregate demand 
•f u n c t i o n s f o 11 o w s a t o n c e. 
The cumulative density -f un et ion H ., (s , > mentioned in the 
mn • -ffin • 
propositions 1.1. and 1.2 is defined as follows s 
"mn'" -JN "mn ;' -+1 
i-j I c ) 
mn :' '-mn' 
h , ( s mn • -mr 
m-
) ds 
m n • --s-i 
„ d s (.Hl) 'mn :' ~#J 
M ; rv' ,, n = 0 , 1, . . . ,N 
T h e c h o i c e p r o b a b i 1 i t i e s rr , c a n 
mn • ~m 
wr :en as : 
mn • -*n 
H , (w ds mn :' ' 'mn' -+1' - co n ''mn' Hn-1'
 sn' wmn' -jn+1*'" 
. , w , ,.,) d £ 
mn • -*N n 
(A2> 
m= 1, . . . , H ,, n ,, n:' =0, 1, . . . , M 
where the variables w , ,n are de-fined in the text. Equation (A2) 
mn' -m • • 
is equivalent to (3). We will denote the transpose of the vector 
C w 
• mn • - n - l ' n mn • nn + l- • mn • ~sN -mn • mn • ~w. • 
iAlhen t h e i n d i r e c t u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s U 
mn' -wi 
a r e c o n 11 n u o u s i n t h e ï r 
are urnen'ts the variables w , ., ., will be conti nuous in x , , and m n ' -i-n • • - n • • 
- n 
n e c h a n q e t h a t o c c u r s i n rr ., as 
mn' -4n 
consequence ot a chanqe in 
one of the explanatorv variables x will be denoted as /Js?r „ and 
' ' n • • ï mn • -in 
can be determined as beinq equal to s 
mn • -;n ' ös 
— co mn • ~wi 
•! ., (w ., + /Jw ., ) mn • —mn • —mn ' 
mn' —'n 
H ., (w ., ) ]ds ., (A2) mn • -mn ' mn • -ïn 
m:=l ,,.„.,, !vl , n :' , n = 0 , 1, . . . ,, N 
where 4w ., denotes the chanqe in w ., that occurs as a consequence 
-mn' '• -mn • 
of the chanqe in x , ., . . It is now easv to see that the conti nui tv oi 
n • • ï 
the variables w ., ., ., and of the p ar ti al derivative 3H ., /ds 
m n • -)n • • ' mn • n 
q t ..i a r a n t. e e s c o n t s . n u i t y 
p r o v e s t h a t c o n t i n u i t y 
d :i. -f f e r e n t i a b i 1 i t v o f t 
3 f ?v . i n a l l v a n a o l e s x ...., x x..... m i s 
mn' -wi -u- 1 • • -N 
:he indirect utiïti i es and conr i nuou; 
density f unc t i on is suf fi c ient fo 
snti nui •!•••.,• r-,4- the choice probabilities. 11 is easy ta 
condi Ï: i ons are ai so nec:essary by consi deri ng what WDUl d happen wn 
e i t h e r t h e v a r i a b l e i s w ., ., , o r t h e o a r t i a l c i e r i v a t i v e 31-1 , /ds 
mn • -ei • • " mn • n 
were not di f ferent iatale. This praves proposition 1.1» 
In order to prove proposition 1.2 we f i r s t observe that i t i s 
the i n di r ec t u t i11 i t i es u si nee we nave the c n ai 
f n n •' ••••ei' 
n ' 
drr ., / 3x .. , . - (drr , / CTU ., ., , ) „ ( d u , , ., / 
mn • -w": n • ' ï mn ' --sn mn • - n • • mn ' -sn • • 
m= i ,, „ „ „ ,, M , n „ n :' = 0 , 1 . . , N 
and the indirect utilities are ,, by assumption « di f f erenti abl e in 
thei r ar qument s„ 
Mow consider the consequences of a sma iTt Zj '! 1 r~ H -'S !'-: J -! a n q e i n o n e o t t n e 
. n d i r e c t u t i l t i e s U _ ., ., , n : ' :' F n „ T h e v e e - t o r £m , t h e n n a s a s i t -
mn • -jn • • - m n • 
a r q urnen t s o n 1 y z e r o ; ' s 
e l e m e n t e q u a l s ~MJ 
1 mn • -*n 
The ratio of the change 
; y. c e o t f o r t h e n :' ;' -1 h p o s i t i o n , where the 
that occurs as a consequence of 
ÏB chanqe in 
mn' -jn 
mn • -n 
can be determined as beinq equal to s 
mn • -m mn • -WÏ ' 
C -
mn ' -ei 
H , (w ., + Ém 
mn• - m n ' -mn 
_ r , , w 
as , mn• - m n ' 
mn ' -*"i 
4LJ , ., ., ]• d s .. <A4) 
mn • -*n • • mn • -*n 
r ï i ' " l ^ « « « ^ Ï'I a n ii n 
with 4w , as discussed above. Takinq the l i m i t tor MJ ., -s0 „ the 
•-•mn • ••• mn • -n 
r igh t hand si de of (A4) becomes equal to „ 
;./ x ., u ir 
-co mn ' -)n mn • ~r> • • 
•I .. (w ., ) » d s 
mn ' — mn • mn ' ~AI 
I H J J 
When th is inteqral exists i t is equal to drr /DU , , , . We know , bv 
n mn • ~n • ' " 
assumption ,, that the second order partial derivative in A5 exists 
everywhere and is continuous» Si nee it is the second-order derivative 
of a well-behaved we can also be sure that the integral (AS) exists. 
Si nee dn .. / ÖU ., is equal to -E ., ., drr ., / dl.1 ., , ., we can mn" -n mn" --in rv • ?sn mn • -n mn • -n • • 
be sur e that this partial derivative will also exist,, We have 
t h e r e f o r e s h o w n t h a t d i f f e r ent i a b i 1 i t y o f the i n d i r e e t u t :i I i tv 
tunctions and twice ditferentiabi1ity ai the density function 
guarantees di -f f erenti abi I i ty o-f the aggregate clemand functions. 
By considering what would happen when one (or faoth) of these 
conditions are not -fuif il led i t is easy to se e that they are al sa 
n e c e s s a r y.. T h i s c o m p Istes t h e p r o o t o t p r op osition 1.2. 
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